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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
This appeal requires us to determine whether the 
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (“CDA”), Pub. L. No. 111-
350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3816-26 (2011) (to be codified at 41 
U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109),1
 
 bars breach of contract and 
“essentially contractual” claims against the United States 
Postal Service (“USPS”) in the district courts of the United 
States.  We find that it does, and will affirm.  
                                                 
1  On January 4, 2011, subsequent to the completion of 
briefing in this appeal, Congress altered the provisions of the 
CDA in ways immaterial to our analysis.  The session laws 
reflecting the alterations also note that the CDA will be 
recodified.  See Act of Jan. 4, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 
124 Stat. 3677, 3816-26.  Accordingly, the provisions of the 
CDA formerly listed in the U.S. Code at 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-
613 will be listed at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7109.  We cite to the 
session laws and note the expected codification section of the 
U.S. Code because recodification was not finalized at the time 
of this Opinion.    
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I. 
The factual background of this case is not complicated 
and is largely undisputed.  Anselma Crossing, L.P. 
(“Anselma”), is the owner and developer of a piece of real 
estate in Chester Springs, Pennsylvania.  In November 2009, 
Anselma filed a complaint against the USPS—amended in 
February 2010—alleging that Anselma and the USPS agreed 
in March 2007 that the USPS would lease a post office 
building from Anselma which Anselma would construct at its 
site in or around 2010.  The agreement was not reduced to 
writing.  Anselma alleged that the USPS made representations 
to the local government that Anselma had been chosen as a 
new USPS site.  In reliance on the agreement and the USPS’s 
representations, Anselma claims to have spent substantial 
sums on engineering, professional, and environmental 
services directly related to constructing a building that would 
meet USPS requirements.  At some point in late 2008, the 
USPS made an internal decision to rescind all formerly 
approved new projects, a decision which affected 400 
projects, including the Anselma project.  Anselma was 
informed of the USPS’s decision when the USPS replied to 
inquiries from Anselma’s Congressman in March 2009.  
Anselma sought $150,000 in damages under theories of 
breach of contract and promissory estoppel.    
       
The USPS moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1).  The District Court heard oral argument 
and granted the USPS’s motion, reaffirming its decision in 
Spodek v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 2d 750, 753 (E.D. Pa. 
1998), where, in a case similar to the one before us, it found 
that the CDA barred jurisdiction in the federal district courts 
over breach of contract claims against the USPS.  This timely 
appeal followed.2
 
   
 On an appeal from a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, 
                                                 
2  We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.   
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we exercise plenary review over legal conclusions and review 
a district court’s findings of fact for clear error.  CNA v. 
United States, 535 F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008).   
 
II. 
The question of whether a district court has jurisdiction 
to entertain a breach of contract claim against the USPS is 
simply stated but not so simply resolved.  Indeed, to answer 
the question we must examine the interplay between the CDA 
and various provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act 
(“PRA”), 39 U.S.C. §§ 401, 409, 410, as well as the issue of 
sovereign immunity.   
 
It is well settled that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign 
immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies 
from suit.”  FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994).  The 
United States must consent to be sued, and “the existence of 
consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction.”  United States v. 
Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).  The USPS is an 
“independent establishment” of the executive branch and, 
thus, is part of the government and cannot be sued absent a 
waiver.  U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA) Ltd., 540 
U.S. 736, 744 (2004) (citing 39 U.S.C. § 201).  The 
government has waived the immunity of the USPS through 
the PRA, which gives the USPS the power to “sue and be 
sued in its official name.”  39 U.S.C § 401(1); see also 
Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. at 741.  Relevant to this appeal, § 
409(a) of the PRA states that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided 
in this title, the United States district courts shall have original 
but not exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought by or 
against the Postal Service.”  39 U.S.C. § 409(a).   
 
The question before us, then, is not whether an 
aggrieved party may bring a claim against the USPS—it 
can—but where the claim may be brought.  With respect to 
claims sounding in contract, the CDA “established a 
comprehensive framework for resolving contract disputes 
between executive branch agencies and government 
contractors.”  Menominee Indian Tribe v. United States, 614 
F.3d 519, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  The CDA applies to any 
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express or implied contract entered into by an executive 
agency for the procurement of property, services, 
construction, repair, or the disposal of personal property.  
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be 
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)).  Under the CDA, a claim for 
breach of contract must be presented to a designated 
contracting officer.  A party may appeal a decision by the 
contracting officer to the relevant board of contract appeals or 
to the United States Court of Federal Claims.  Id. at § 3, 124 
Stat. at 3817-22 (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103-7105).3
 
  
“The CDA is intended to keep government contract disputes 
out of district courts; it limits review of the merits of 
government contract disputes to certain forums, both to limit 
the waiver of sovereign immunity and to submit government 
contract issues to forums that have specialized knowledge and 
experience.”  United States v. Kasler Elec. Co., 123 F.3d 341, 
346 (6th Cir. 1997); see also S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at 1 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235 (noting 
that the purpose of the CDA is to “help to induce resolution of 
more contract disputes by negotiation prior to litigation; 
equalize the bargaining power of the parties when a dispute 
exists; provide alternate forums suitable to handle different 
types of disputes; and insure fair and equitable treatment to 
contractors and Government agencies”).   
A.  
Anselma argues that the plain language of § 401(1) of 
the PRA allows the USPS to “sue and be sued,” that federal 
district courts have original but not exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear claims against the USPS under § 409(a) of the PRA, and 
that the CDA does not bar breach of contract claims in the 
federal district courts.  Anselma relies on our decision in 
Licata v. U.S. Postal Service, 33 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 1994), 
which raised but left open the precise question in this appeal.   
                                                 
3  The CDA “established” a board of contract appeals 
within the USPS called the Postal Service Board of Contract 
Appeals.  Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3822 
(2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1)).          
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In Licata, the plaintiff sued the USPS for breach of 
contract.  Two issues were raised:  (1) whether § 409(a) 
provided an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction; 
and (2) whether the Tucker Act deprived the district courts of 
jurisdiction over the USPS.  Only the first issue is relevant 
here.  As to that issue, we disagreed with the line of cases 
holding that subject matter jurisdiction did not exist under § 
409(a) without a separate valid cause of action.  Id. at 262 
(“[W]e believe that the Postal Service’s argument . . . that 
subject matter jurisdiction is absent without a cause of action 
is seriously flawed because whether or not a cause of action 
exists goes to the merits, not to the question of subject-matter 
jurisdiction.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Instead, we held that § 409(a) had a plain meaning that gave a 
“clear and unequivocal grant of jurisdiction to the district 
courts.”  Id. at 261 (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Accordingly, we held that “absent some other 
statutory bar, section 409(a) grants district courts subject 
matter jurisdiction over actions to which the Postal Service is 
a party.”  Id. at 263.  Importantly, we also clarified that § 
401(1), the PRA’s “sue and be sued” clause, addresses the 
USPS’s waiver of sovereign immunity, while § 409(a) 
addresses subject matter jurisdiction, and that it was error to 
conflate the two provisions when considering whether the 
district court had jurisdiction over cases involving the USPS.  
Id. at 262.  Sua sponte, we raised, but left open, the possibility 
that the CDA was a statutory bar to § 409(a)’s grant of 
jurisdiction, id. at 254 n.6, the question we answer today.4
 
   
The USPS urges us to follow U.S. Postal Service v. 
Flamingo Industries (USA), Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004), 
                                                 
4  Following Licata, district courts within the Third 
Circuit have not been consistent as to whether the CDA bars 
federal district court jurisdiction over contract claims against 
the USPS.  Compare Eagle Fence Co., v. V.S. Electric, Inc., 
324 F. Supp. 2d 621, 626 (E.D. Pa. 2004) (dismissing claim 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction), and Spodek, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d at 755 (same), with Pike v. U.S. Postal Serv., 886 F. 
Supp. 487, 490-91 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding that district court 
had jurisdiction).   
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decided ten years after Licata.  In Flamingo Industries, the 
Court addressed the question of how to determine when the 
“sue and be sued” clause of 39 U.S.C. § 401(1) permits suits 
against the USPS.  Plaintiffs there sued the USPS under 
federal antitrust law.  The Court described a two-step process 
for determining whether the USPS could be subject to 
substantive liability.  First, “[w]e ask . . . whether there is a 
waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against the Postal 
Service.  If there is, we ask the second question, which is 
whether the substantive prohibitions of the Sherman Act 
apply to an independent establishment of the Executive 
Branch of the United States.”  Id. at 743.  In explaining why 
the second step was “important,” the Court stated that “[a]n 
absence of immunity does not result in liability if the 
substantive law in question is not intended to reach the federal 
entity.  So we proceed to [the] second step to determine if the 
substantive antitrust liability defined by the statute extends to 
the Postal Service.”  Id. at 744.  Applying its two-step 
process, the Court determined that under the first step, § 
401(1) waived immunity.  Under the second step, it 
determined that because neither the government nor the USPS 
was a “person” under the Sherman Act, the USPS “is not 
controlled by the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 748.5
 
     
Flamingo Industries is not, however, directly 
applicable to the question before us, i.e. whether the CDA is a 
statutory bar to § 409(a)’s grant of jurisdiction to the federal 
district courts.  Flamingo Industries only discussed the waiver 
of sovereign immunity under § 401(1), which addresses 
whether the USPS can be sued; it did not discuss § 409(a), 
which addresses where the USPS can be sued once sovereign 
immunity has been waived.6
                                                 
5  Flamingo Industries did not establish new law; the 
two-part test had been established in FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 
471, 484 (1994).     
  See, e.g., Cont’l Cablevision of 
6  Even if we applied Flamingo Industries, we would 
conclude that Anselma satisfies the two-part test.  Under the 
first part, there is no question that the “sue and be sued” 
clause of § 401(1) waives sovereign immunity.  Under the 
second part, we look to the substantive claim to see whether 
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St. Paul, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 945 F.2d 1434, 1437 (8th 
Cir. 1991) (explaining that § 409(a) is a grant of jurisdiction, 
while § 401(1) is a waiver of sovereign immunity).  Licata set 
forth the law of this circuit regarding § 401(1)’s relevance—
or, more appropriately, irrelevance—to a § 409(a) analysis of 
subject matter jurisdiction, and the subsequently decided 
Flamingo Industries does not require a reevaluation of Licata.   
 
B. 
At issue, then, is the question that Licata left open—
whether the CDA is a statutory bar to the jurisdiction granted 
to the federal district courts in § 409(a).  Although we find, 
for the reasons stated below, that it is, we must first explain 
why the CDA continues to apply to the USPS following the 
2006 amendments to the statute. 
i. 
 Under the heading, “Applicability of [C]hapter,” the 
CDA states 
 
(a) EXECUTIVE AGENCY 
CONTRACTS.—Unless otherwise 
specifically provided in this chapter, this 
chapter applies to any express or implied 
contract (including those of the 
nonappropriated fund activities described 
                                                                                                             
Congress intended it to apply to the government agency.  In 
Flamingo Industries, the Court held that the USPS was not a 
“person” and therefore not controlled by the antitrust laws.  
Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. at 744-48.  Here, however, 
Anselma alleges breach of contract, and the CDA allows 
contract claims to proceed against the government and the 
USPS—it simply specifies where the claim must proceed.  
See, e.g., Pinckney v. United States, 88 Fed. Cl. 490, 505 
(Fed. Cl. 2009) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims . 
. . has jurisdiction to ‘render judgment upon any claim against 
the United States founded . . . upon any express or implied 
contract with the United States.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1491(a)(1))).    
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in sections 1346 and 1491 of title 28) 
made by an executive agency for— 
 
(1) the procurement of property, other 
than real property in being; 
 
(2) the procurement of services; 
 
(3) the procurement of construction, 
alteration, repair, or maintenance of real 
property; or 
 
(4) the disposal of personal property. 
 
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be 
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7102(a)) (emphasis added). 
 
 Until 2006, and since the Act’s enactment in 1978, 41 
U.S.C. § 601, the former definitional section of the CDA, 
defined the term “executive agency” as  
 
an executive department as defined in 
section 101 of Title 5, an independent 
establishment as defined by section 104 
of Title 5 (except that it shall not include 
the Government Accountability Office), 
a military department as defined by 
section 102 of Title 5, and a wholly 
owned Government corporation as 
defined by section 9101(3) of Title 31, 
the United States Postal Service, and the 
Postal Rate Commission 
 
41 U.S.C. § 601(2) (2004), amended by 41 U.S.C. § 601(2) 
(2006) (emphasis added).  In 2006, however, Congress 
amended the CDA to strike out the phrase, “the United States 
Postal Service, and the Postal Rate Commission.”  See 41 
U.S.C. § 601(2) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 
3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 
7101(8)).  The recently recodified statute retains the 2006 
amendment, defining an “executive agency” as 
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(A) an executive department as defined in 
section 101 of title 5; 
 
 (B) a military department as defined in 
section 102 of title 5; 
 
(C) an independent establishment as 
defined in section 104 of title 5, except 
that the term does not include the 
Government Accountability Office; and 
 
(D) a wholly owned Government 
corporation as defined in section 9101(3) 
of title 31. 
 
Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 124 Stat. 3677, 3817 (2011) (to be 
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 7101(8)).  
 
None of the definitions of “executive agency” includes 
the USPS, a point the USPS concedes.   The USPS argues, 
however, that the CDA continues to apply to the USPS 
because (1) the 2006 amendments to the CDA reauthorized 
the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals, and thus the 
statute continued to treat the USPS as an executive agency 
(and the 2011 recodification continues that reauthorization);7
                                                 
7  Added as part of the 2006 amendments, § 607(c)  
 
 
established an agency board of contract appeals 
to be known as the “Postal Service Board of 
Contract Appeals”.  Such board shall have 
jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision 
of a contracting officer of the United States 
Postal Service or the Postal Regulatory 
Commission relative to a contract made by 
either agency. . . . This chapter shall apply to 
contract disputes before the Postal Service 
Board of Contract Appeals in the same manner 
as they apply to contract disputes before the 
Civilian Board.   
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and (2) there is no evidence in the legislative history that 
Congress intended to remove the USPS from the CDA.8
                                                                                                             
41 U.S.C. § 607(c), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 
124 Stat. 3677, 3822 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. § 
7105(d)-(e)). 
  
8  The legislative history of the 2006 amendments is 
silent on Congress’ rationale for striking the USPS from § 
601(2).  The 2006 amendments were included in a bill titled 
“National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.”  
The report on the Act from the House of Representatives 
states, in relevant part, only that the Act  
 
would provide conforming amendments to 
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (Disputes 
Act) (41 U.S.C. 601) needed by the 
establishment of the Defense Board of 
Contract Appeals and the Civilian Board of 
Contract Appeals (Civilian Board) regarding 
contract disputes. This section also would 
establish the Postal Service Board of 
Contract Appeals to decide appeals under 
the Disputes Act for contracts awarded by 
the United States Postal Service or the 
Postal Rate Commission and provide for the 
selection and appointment of Board judges 
by the Postmaster General in the same 
manner as judges of the Civilian Board.     
 
H.R. Rep. No. 109-89, at 397 (2005) (emphasis added).   
 
This section explains the “establish[ment]” of the 
Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals, but nowhere is 
there an explanation of why § 601(2) removed all reference to 
the USPS.  Congress’ silence, in the presence of contrary 
additions to the 2006 statute, weighs against a finding that 
Congress intended a wholesale removal of the USPS from the 
CDA.  See NLRB v. Plasterers’ Local Union No. 79, 
Operative Plasterers’ and Cement Masons’ Int’l Ass’n, 404 
U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971) (noting that the Supreme Court “has 
frequently cautioned that ‘(i)t is at best treacherous to find in 
 12 
Unfortunately for the USPS, by removing it from the 
definition of “executive agency” while at the same time 
adding provisions regarding the jurisdiction of the Postal 
Service Board of Contract Appeals, Congress created an 
ambiguity about whether the Act applies to it at all. 
 
We need not resolve this ambiguity, however, because 
there is another, unambiguous reason for why the CDA 
applies to the USPS.  That reason is this:  the PRA permits the 
USPS to adopt the CDA via its own internal regulations, see 
39 U.S.C. §410(a), and it has done so in 39 C.F.R. § 601.109.  
  
Section 410(a) states that 
Except as provided by subsection (b) of 
this section, and except as otherwise 
provided in this title or insofar as such 
laws remain in force as rules or 
regulations of the Postal Service, no 
Federal law dealing with public or 
Federal contracts, property, works, 
officers, employees, budgets, or funds, 
including the provisions of chapters 5 
and 7 of title 5, shall apply to the 
exercise of the powers of the Postal 
Service.  
 
39 U.S.C. § 410(a) (emphasis added).  Stated more succinctly, 
the CDA does not apply to the USPS unless the CDA 
“remain[s] in force as rules or regulations of the Postal 
Service.”  Id.  The USPS argues that Congress, by virtue of § 
410(a), allowed it to decide whether or not to remain bound 
by the CDA, and that it has decided to do so by administrative 
regulation in 39 C.F.R. § 601.109.  See 39 C.F.R. § 601.109 
(“This section implements the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 
                                                                                                             
Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule 
of law.’” (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 
(1946))). 
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as amended (41 U.S.C. 601-613).”).  Although we agree with 
the USPS that “[t]o argue that a federal agency, by regulation, 
can effectively limit the jurisdiction of federal district courts 
is counterintuitive,” see Appellee’s Letter Br. of December 
20, 2010 at 7 n.5, a literal reading of the statute supports the 
USPS’s right, via authorization by Congress, to adopt the 
CDA in whole as part its own administrative regulations.  
Accordingly, the CDA continues to apply to the USPS, 
regardless of any ambiguity within the 2006 amendments and 
2011 recodification.      
 
ii. 
 We turn, finally, to the main issue in this case:  
whether the CDA overrides the grant of jurisdiction to the 
federal district courts in § 409(a).  The USPS argues that § 
409(a) “is a general grant of jurisdiction that is necessarily 
limited by more specific grants of exclusive jurisdiction to 
other courts or administrative bodies,” and that the CDA is 
such a specific statute.  Appellee’s Br. at 22.  It cites to 
opinions of the Supreme Court and this Court stating that 
precisely written statutes prevail over more general statutes.  
See Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976) 
(“In a variety of contexts the Court has held that a precisely 
drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.”); 
D. Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932) 
(“Specific terms prevail over the general in the same or 
another statute which otherwise might be controlling.”); In re 
Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 328 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Statutory Construction 101 contains the canon that a 
specific provision will prevail over a general one.”).  “The 
CDA,” the USPS concludes, “is a specific statute that applies 
to procurement contracts and vests exclusive jurisdiction over 
claims in the Court of Federal Claims or the agency board of 
contract appeals.”  In contrast, “[t]he jurisdictional grant in 39 
U.S.C. § 409 applies to a wide, undifferentiated mass of 
claims and is therefore plainly more general.  Thus, the CDA 
controls as to claims within its scope.”  Appellee’s Br. at 22-
23.               
 
The clear majority of courts of appeals that have 
 14 
addressed whether the CDA bars federal district court 
jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the USPS 
have found that it does.  In Goodin v. U.S. Postal Inspection 
Serv., 444 F.3d 998 (8th Cir. 2006), for example, the plaintiff 
brought breach of contract claims and the district court 
dismissed based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction under 
the CDA.  On appeal, plaintiff argued that the district court 
had jurisdiction based on the sue and be sued clause of § 
401(1).  Id. at 1000.  The Eighth Circuit rejected the argument 
because (1) “a ‘precisely drawn, detailed statute [—the 
CDA—] preempts more general remedies,’” id. at 1001 
(quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 834); and (2) the CDA contains a 
provision (41 U.S.C. § 602(b), to be recodified at 41 U.S.C. § 
7102(b)) that exempts disputes over certain specific contracts 
formed by the Tennessee Valley Authority (whose contract 
contains a sue and be sued clause).  “[I]f  Congress had 
intended sue and be sued clauses to enable parties to escape 
the exclusive jurisdiction provided by the CDA and sue in 
federal district court, it would not have needed to specify in 
41 U.S.C. § 602(b) that disputes over some contracts formed 
by the Tennessee Valley Authority . . . are exempted from the 
CDA.”  Id.; see also Campanella v. Commerce Exch. Bank, 
137 F.3d 885, 890-92 (6th Cir. 1998) (sue and be sued clause 
in SBA legislation did not provide district court jurisdiction 
for contract claim); A&S Council Oil Co., v. Lader, 56 F.3d 
234, 241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. J&E 
Salvage Co., 55 F.3d 985, 988 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding 
contract actions against USPS barred from district court 
without mention of PRA provisions); Jackson v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 799 F.2d 1018, 1022 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating without 
analysis that the enactment of the CDA in 1978 removed 
concurrent jurisdiction over suits against the USPS from the 
federal district courts); but see In re Liberty Constr., 9 F.3d 
800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1993) (SBA’s sue and be sued clause 
provided an independent statutory grant of jurisdiction in 
federal district court); Wright v. U.S. Postal Serv., 29 F.3d 
1426, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying reasoning of Liberty 
Construction to USPS based on 39 U.S.C. § 401(1)); Marine 
Coatings of Ala., Inc. v. United States, 932 F.2d 1370, 1377 
(11th Cir. 1991) (contract claim against the government could 
proceed in district court, but only because of jurisdiction 
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through the Maritime Lien Act).    
 
The opinions cited above generally analyzed the 
relationship of the CDA to § 401(1) without any analysis of § 
409(a), much less any analysis of whether § 409(a) provided a 
jurisdictional grant separate from § 401(1).  Licata, on the 
other hand, instructs that § 409(a) is the section of the PRA 
addressing subject matter jurisdiction in the federal district 
courts, and § 401(1) addresses only the USPS’s waiver of 
sovereign immunity, Licata, 33 F.3d at 262.  Accordingly, our 
concern is with § 409(a), and the cases cited above are not 
directly on point. 
 
That said, we are persuaded by the reasoning of those 
cases which conclude that the CDA bars district court 
jurisdiction, despite the jurisdictional grant in § 409(a).  The 
CDA was enacted in 1978, later in time than the PRA, which 
was enacted in 1970.  The provisions of the CDA governing 
jurisdiction are both more recently and more precisely drawn 
than the terms of the PRA, compare Pub. L. No. 111-350, § 3, 
124 Stat. 3677, 3817-20 (2011) (to be codified at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 7103-7104), with 39 U.S.C. § 409(a), and “a specific 
provision will prevail over a general one.”  In re Phila. 
Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 328.  Further, the CDA specifically 
lists several types of contracts that are excluded from its 
coverage, and “nowhere does the statute exclude contracts 
with the USPS from coverage.”  See Prefab Prods., Inc. v. 
U.S. Postal Serv., 600 F. Supp. 89, 91-92 (S.D. Fla. 1984) 
(citing, as examples of excluded contracts, the former 41 
U.S.C. §§ 602(b) (to be recodified at § 7102(b)) (certain 
Tennessee Valley Authority contracts), 602(c) (to be 
recodified at § 7102(c)) (certain contracts with foreign 
governments), and 603 (to be recodified at § 7102(d)) (certain 
maritime contracts)).  Finally, and importantly, a ruling that 
would permit contract claims against the USPS to be heard in 
the federal district courts and thereafter in the twelve courts of 
appeals would undermine the policy goals of the CDA—to 
collect contract disputes against the government in a forum, 
be it the Postal Service Board of Contract Appeals or in the 
Court of Claims, with both the requisite expertise and the 
ability to provide consistency in applying the laws related to 
 16 
government contracts.   
 
We conclude that because the CDA is a statutory bar to 
jurisdiction over breach of contract claims against the USPS 
in the federal district courts, the District Court properly 
dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.      
 
III. 
 The order of the District Court will be affirmed.     
 
